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7. What can intellectual property law
learn from happiness research?
Estelle Derclaye*
INTRODUCTION
As the description of the 2012 ATRIP congress’s theme highlights,
traditionally, scholars have used historical, doctrinal or comparative
analyses, law and economics, political economy or philosophy, to discuss
intellectual property law. Other methods such as empirical analysis,
international relations, and human development are more recent. This
chapter looks at intellectual property law in a new way, namely through
the angle of happiness or well-being research.1
The field of happiness research is not that recent but strangely, so far,
happiness researchers have hardly discussed the relationship between
well-being and technology despite the pervasive role of the latter in
contemporary society.2 Likewise, the discussion of happiness is also rare
in the legal field (except of course in (mental) health law)3 and it is
absent from intellectual property law,4 except indirectly through the
discussion of the capability approach in the discourse on intellectual
* I would like to thank P. Brey, G. Duncan, J. Hirata and R. Veenhoven for
providing me with references on happiness research and for the time they took to
enlighten me on happiness research.
1 I will use the terms well-being and happiness interchangeably in this
chapter. Section 2 gives a definition of the concepts.
2 P. Brey, ‘Well-Being in Philosophy, Psychology, and Economics’, in P.
Brey, A. Briggle and E. Spence (eds), The Good Life in a Technological Age,
Routledge, 2012, p. 28.
3 J. Bronsteen, C. Buccafusco and J. Masur, ‘Welfare as Happiness’ (2010)
98 Georgetown Law Journal 1583; E. Posner and C. Sunstein (eds), Law and
Happiness, University of Chicago Press, 2010.
4 For initial scholarship, see E. Derclaye, ‘Eudemonic Intellectual Property:
Patents and Related Rights as Engines of Happiness, Peace and Sustainability’
(2012) 14(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 495–543.
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property and development.5 I consciously leave the capability approach
for another article but it needs to be noted that there are parallels to be
drawn between the application of happiness research on the one hand and
the capability approach on the other hand, to intellectual property law. In
effect, the two approaches converge or are complementary in many
respects.6
There is a debate to be had about the value of happiness research for
the field of intellectual property law. The discussion is worth having
especially to check whether the current basis of intellectual property
rights (IPR), and the norms that derive from it, are still up-to-date or else
should be revised. This chapter focuses on the application of happiness
research to patents and related rights, by and large designs, utility models
and plant variety rights. However, a broader reflection of the relationship
between happiness or well-being and other IPR such as copyright and
trademarks, is worth pursuing as well. This chapter is obviously con-
cerned only with one way to increase happiness, namely through the
fostering of technology using the intellectual property system. There are
many other ways to increase happiness, for instance to promote positive
traits in a person, and this often does not need any technology.7 As Frey
says, “In current happiness research, … the integration among disciplines
often go[es] so far that it is not possible to identify whether a particular
contribution is due to an economist, a psychologist, a sociologist or a
political scientist.”8 In addition, many of their findings and recommenda-
tions coincide. Therefore, the chapter will amalgamate the recommenda-
tions of the researchers in each branch (law, economics, political
sciences, psychology, sociology and philosophy), only highlighting dif-
ferences of opinion between the branches if and when they exist.
5 See e.g. T. Wong and G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property and Human
Development, Current Trends and Future Scenarios, Cambridge University Press,
2010; M. Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global
Justice, Yale University Press, 2012.
6 See e.g. R. Veenhoven, ‘Capability and Happiness, Conceptual Difference
and Reality Links’ (2010) 39 Journal of Socio-Economics, 344–350 (surveys
show that in most cases capability leads to happiness and happiness enhances
capability).
7 C. Hsee, F. Xu and N. Tang, ‘Two Recommendations on the Pursuit of
Happiness’ (2008) 37 Journal of Legal Studies S115 cite for example, S.
Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach to Getting the Life
You Want, Penguin Press, 2007 and M. Seligman, Authentic Happiness: Using
the New Positive Psychology to Realize your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment,
Free Press, 2002.
8 B. Frey, Happiness: A Revolution in Economics, MIT Press, 2008, p. 14.
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The chapter first traces the origin and history of happiness research, it
then defines happiness (section 2) and summarises the findings (section
3) and the recommendations (section 5) of happiness research, after
having determined that policymakers should take happiness research into
account (section 4). Finally, section 6 explains the relevance of happiness
research to intellectual property law and draws from happiness research
findings to propose a recalibration of patents and related rights’ goals and
substantive law.
1. WHAT IS HAPPINESS RESEARCH? ORIGIN AND
BRIEF HISTORY
Happiness as a topic of reflection is very ancient. It started centuries ago
in Antiquity, with the, mainly Greek, philosophers.9 Thereafter, the topic
became more or less dormant, it is only in the 17th and 18th century,
during the Enlightenment, that several thinkers re-examined the topic and
advocated the idea that happiness should be a public policy goal.10 Most
representative of this period are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.11
Then again the topic attracted less interest. It is then only relatively
recently, in the second part of the 20th century, that happiness was
resurrected as a main research interest in the social sciences. Happiness
research involves several social sciences: philosophy, psychology, polit-
ical science, sociology, economics and law. It even involves biology to
some extent.12 It is at the end of the 1950s that first the psychologists
9 Brey, above n. 2, p. 15.
10 D. Bok, The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from the
New Research on Well-Being, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 4.
11 See e.g. B. Frey and A. Stutzer, ‘Should Happiness be Maximised?’, in A.
Dutt and B. Radcliff (eds), Happiness, Economics, and Politics: Toward a
Multi-Disciplinary Approach, Edward Elgar, 2009, pp. 97–126; R. Layard,
Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, Penguin, 2011, pp. 21 and 23 (Bentham
and Mill’s conceptions, however, clash to some extent. Indeed, while both
Bentham and Mill believed that human beings seek pleasure as opposed to pain,
Mill, contrary to Bentham, classified pleasures into lower and higher ones, the
latter being better than the former).
12 Layard, above n. 11, p. 24 (stating that happiness (seeking pleasure rather
than pain) is natural for all animals and is what has made our species survive
throughout the ages); R. Easterlin, ‘Building a Better Theory of Well-Being’, in
L. Bruni and P.-L. Porta (eds), Economics and Happiness: Framing the Analysis,
Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 60 (“The persistence of aspirations for a happy
marriage among those who are in broken unions may reflect the importance to
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started studying it, in addition to their previous sole focus on mental
illness.13 Then came the sociologists and philosophers in the 1980s14 and
the economists15 and political scientists16 in the 1990s. Perhaps the main
reason why happiness research regained interest, especially as a goal for
policy, has been the awareness of the negative consequences of the recent
focus on materialism. The increasing trend in the (mainly Western)
population’s materialism, prompted by selfishness, greed and the disap-
pearance of religion and ideologies like Marxism and socialism, left a
gap in which wild capitalism could thrive.17 A particular component of
capitalism, technological development, brought with it the consumer
society which, while bringing many benefits, has arguably also lead to
“exuberant materialism and a loss of spiritual values and feelings of
community”.18 As we shall see below, happiness researchers have found
that accumulating wealth beyond a certain point does not bring happiness
while quality human relationships are essential components of it. We can
then already perceive the relevance this research might have on intellec-
tual property law: the use of IPR as a tool for economic growth is a
recurrent theme, if not a mantra, in policy-making discourse on IPR.
However, it is doubtful that economic growth leads to happiness in
developed countries.
2. WHAT IS HAPPINESS?
Happiness research literature uses the term “happiness” to refer to a
variety of concepts and researchers do not all agree on what kind of
group survival of mating and reproduction. Correspondingly, the disproportionate
importance of adaptation in the economic domain may be because those whose
material aspirations were never satisfied were more likely to survive, and, as a
result, we have inherited their genes (Buss 1996; Kasser 2002). If so, we are
paying the price today in happiness forgone of our forebears’ survival success”).
13 R. Veenhoven, ‘Happiness as a Public Policy Aim: The Greatest Happi-
ness Principle’, in P. Linley and S. Joseph (eds), Positive Psychology in Practice,
Wiley, 2004, pp. 658–678, at 660.
14 Brey, above n. 2, p. 16.
15 See e.g. Frey, above n. 8, p. 13; Brey, above n. 2, p. 26; Veenhoven, above
n. 13, p. 660. With his 1974 article (below n. 47), Easterlin was a precursor
though.
16 E.g. R. Lane, The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies, Yale
University Press, 2001, quoted in Frey above n. 8.
17 Layard, above n. 11, p. 266.
18 Brey, above n. 2, p. 29.
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happiness individuals should pursue or governments should further. In
Antiquity, two main conceptions of happiness dominated: that of Epicure
(hedonia) and that of Aristotle (eudaimonia). Contemporary happiness
literature divides itself between these two main well-established, but
opposed, conceptions19 and a third one, desire-satisfactionism.
According to hedonism, also called epicureanism, pleasure is the chief
good.20 In short, or at its most basic, happiness understood in this sense
is a positive affect, e.g. I feel pleasure rather than pain. This is the
concept Bentham used for his theory; Mill also viewed happiness in this
acceptation.21 Happiness in this sense can be evaluated in the short term
(I feel pleasure at this precise moment today) or long term (I feel happy
most of the time in my life).22 Often this latter conception of happiness is
referred to as subjective well-being (SWB)23 or as life-satisfaction, i.e.
overall enjoyment of one’s life as a whole.24
Eudaimonia is “the good life”.25 It comes chiefly from the writings of
Aristotle. Eudaimonia is living well or actualising one’s potential.26 It is
19 G. Duncan, ‘Should Happiness-Maximization Be the Goal of Govern-
ment?’ (2010) 11 Journal of Happiness Studies 163–178, at 166; Brey, above
n. 2, pp. 20–21.
20 See Epicurianism, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition,
2012, available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/189732/
Epicureanism#ref559918
21 Bentham and Mill were hedonists: see Utilitarianism, Encyclopædia
Britannica Online Academic Edition, 2012, available at http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/620682/utilitarianism
22 See e.g. Layard, above n. 11, p. 13.
23 Some commentators use the concept of SWB to refer to both long and
short term components as well as the absence of negative effect. For details, see
E. Diener and R. Lucas, ‘Personality, and Subjective Well-being’, in D. Kahne-
man, E. Diener, E. and N. Schwarz (eds), Well-being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, pp. -229; Brey, above n. 2,
p. 22; Duncan, above n. 19, p. 166.
24 R. Veenhoven, ‘How Universal Is Happiness?’, in E. Diener, J. Helliwell
and Daniel Kahneman (eds) International Differences in Well-Being, Oxford
University Press, 2010, pp. 328–350; Veenhoven, above n. 13, p. 664 (this is
opposed to “pleasures, part satisfactions, top experience” ibid., pp. 661–662).
25 Also called eudaemonism. See Eudaemonism, Encyclopædia Britannica
Online Academic Edition, 2012, available at http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/194960/eudaemonism
26 E. Deci and R. Ryan, ‘Hedonia, Eudaimonia and Well-being: An Intro-
duction’, (2008) 9 Journal of Happiness Studies, 1–11, at 2; Brey, above n. 2,
p. 23.
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following meaningful goals and finding purpose in life.27 While eudai-
monia includes pleasure, it is not merely a life of pleasure(s) but a life
which includes a sense of meaning.28 In philosophy, hedonia envisages
happiness in a subjective way, whereas eudaimonia goes beyond subject-
ive experiences and includes objective factors.29 The two conceptions
exist and correspond in both philosophy and psychology.30 Whereas there
is a dichotomy between eudaimonia and hedonism, there is also partial
overlap between the two concepts, albeit only in one direction: while a
eudaimonic life will by definition comprise hedonic enjoyment, the
converse is not always true.
Desire-satisfactionism holds that happiness occurs when one fulfils
one’s desires or preferences. There are three major desire-fulfilment
theories.31 The main problem with these theories is that they struggle to
account for desires which are bad for us. They also do not explain the
reasons why things may be good for us.32
There is at the moment no resolution between the three rival concepts
of happiness at least in the philosophical field. However, some commen-
tators have tried to bridge the gap between them. “One way to create a
hybrid version is to include pleasure or desire-satisfaction on the object-
ive list. Another approach is to argue that some desires correspond with
objective needs …. Desires are subjective and needs are objective, but
some desires may be expressive of genuine needs, whereas others are not.
Yet another approach is to argue that informed desire-fulfilment or
informed qualitative hedonism would result in the selection of items on
objective list approaches, or to suggest that objective list items are
relative to persons and circumstances, thereby narrowing the gap between
the approaches.”33 Because there is some overlap between the three main
conceptions of happiness, it should be possible to find some common
ground. The chosen meaning of happiness, and the possibility of finding
common ground between the different conceptions of happiness, is
important as it will affect policy if governments decide to include
happiness on their agenda. It is not the purpose of this chapter to choose
27 Deci and Ryan, above n. 26, pp. 6–7.
28 J. Bauer, D. McAdams and J. Pals, ‘Narrative Identity and Eudaimonic
Well-Being’ (2008) 9 Journal of Happiness Studies, pp. 81–104 cited by Edward
Deci and Richard Ryan, above n. 26, at p. 6.
29 Brey, above n. 2, p. 23.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 17 (also called preference-satisfaction theories).
32 Ibid., p. 18.
33 Ibid., pp. 20–21, see also p. 15.
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one meaning but it will have to be done if intellectual property laws are
modified to take happiness into account. Accordingly, in this chapter, I
use the terms happiness and well-being interchangeably and in a general
sense without taking a position on which of the three main conceptions
should win over the other.
3. CAN HAPPINESS BE MEASURED, ARE
MEASUREMENTS RELIABLE AND WHAT ARE THE
RESULTS?
In Bentham’s epoch and up until recently, it was not thought possible to
measure happiness. Researchers have now realised that it is measureable,
like any other social phenomenon such as GDP or (un)employment.34
One measures happiness mainly by direct questioning, i.e. through
surveys simply asking whether people feel happy.35 There are mainly two
types of surveys: life satisfaction surveys (which ask people to indicate
on a scale of e.g. 1 to 10 whether they are happy with their life as a
whole) and surveys using the moment-by-moment experience sampling
method (asking people to record how they feel at several moments of the
day for several days, weeks, etc.). The first type of survey is subject to
respondents’ cognitive and emotional biases as they aim to recollect
happy moments in the more distant past.36 The second method aims to
avoid this.
The measurements are reliable because answers can be checked by
asking for confirmation from the participants’ spouses, family, friends,
colleagues, doctors;37 MRI scans can also be performed on people’s
brains for further confirmation.38 In addition, happiness surveys recur-
rently give similar results across populations and over time.39 Any
potential errors cancel themselves out because of the sheer number of
34 Layard, above n. 11, p. 257.
35 See e.g. Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11, p. 302; Layard above n. 11, pp. 13
ff.
36 Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, above n. 3, at 1599.
37 Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11, pp. 302–306; Bok, above n. 10, p. 39; N.
Powdthavee, ‘Economics of Happiness: A Review of Literature and Applications’
(2007) 19(1) Chulalongkorn Journal of Economics 51–73; Layard, above n. 11,
p. 14.
38 Layard, above n. 11, Chapter 2.
39 Powdthavee, above n. 37, pp. 10 and 14, and references therein; Veen-
hoven, above n. 13, p. 666.
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people surveyed in particular studies. Cultural bias, because the word
happiness is not translated correctly and/or because people tend to give
less accurate answers due to their culture (e.g. to save face), does not
seem to exist or so far appears minimal.40 In sum, even if they are not
perfectly reliable, happiness measurements are often more reliable than
other measurements that policymakers routinely use.41 In addition, even
if some evidence is still lacking and the evidence is not perfect, “In the
end, the relevant question in making policy is not whether self-
evaluations of well-being are perfect but whether they are as accurate as
the best alternate way of gauging people’s preferences, opinions and
needs.”42 In short, happiness research results are reliable enough and can
be used by policymakers. There are two main caveats. First, correlation
does not necessarily imply causation.43 Second, it is important to identify
the direction of causality (e.g. does marriage cause happiness or does
happiness cause people to marry), otherwise a policy measure aimed at
increasing happiness may not have this effect.44
What are the results of the measurements? The main finding is that
even if people’s income has grown steadily and substantially over the last
50 years, the average levels of happiness have stagnated.45 This is true for
the USA but also many other rich countries.46 This paradox is called the
Easterlin paradox after its finder’s name: above a certain level of income,
more income does not make people happy.47 The second important
finding is that humans are not very good at judging what will make them
happy and thus make decisions which leave them unhappy. People
40 Veenhoven, above n. 13, p. 666. See also P. Ouwenell and R. Veenhoven,
‘Cross-National Differences in Happiness, Cultural Bias or Societal Quality?’, in
N. Bleichrodt and P. Drenth (eds), Contemporary Issues in Cross-Cultural
Psychology, Swets & Zeitlinger, 1991, pp. 168–184.
41 Bok, above n. 10, p. 40.
42 Ibid, p. 39.
43 Powdthavee, above n. 37, p. 18.
44 Frey, above n. 8, p. 11.
45 Bok, above n. 10, pp. 5 and 12.
46 Ibid. and Lane, above n. 16.
47 R. Easterlin, ‘Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some
Empirical Evidence’, in P. David and M. Reder (eds), Nations and Households in
Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Moses Abramowitz, Academic Press,
1974, pp. 89–125; M. Anielski, Economics of Happiness: Building Genuine
Wealth, New Society Publishers, 2007, p. 224 cites R. Lane who in his book,
above n. 16, found that in rich countries the “correlation between income and
happiness is close to zero and sometimes negative”.
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misleadingly think that added income will lead to happiness.48 And even
if some people are aware of some of the ingredients of a good life (e.g.
having meaningful relationships), they still forsake them for extra
income.49 The third finding is that people adapt incredibly well.50
Whether their income rises or health deteriorates, people adapt quickly.51
As far as income is concerned, people think more income will make them
happy so they work more to acquire more money or status. Once they
have acquired the extra income, and the extra possessions bought with it,
they grow used to them and want more so they work even harder to
acquire more. In addition, people tend to compare themselves with
others. So the more one person has, the more their neighbour wants to
have to keep being superior, leading to a status race. This is called the
hedonic treadmill and is a race without end, which does not make people
happier.52 Worse still, since people spend more time acquiring income,
they spend less time for instance with friends and family or pursuing
hobbies, which are among the things which make them happy. Indeed,
researchers have found that apart from inherited temperament, what
makes people happy are mainly “marriage, social relationships, employ-
ment, perceived health, religion and the quality of government”.53 Further
studies have even found that human connections “contribute more to
happiness than anything else”.54 The fourth, important and related,
finding is that happiness is not entirely inherited or genetic and thus it
can be increased. Only 50% is biologically determined, while 10% is
determined by environment and luck and the remaining 40% is in the
48 Bok, above n. 10, p. 62; Easterlin, above n. 12, pp. 42 and 47.
49 L. King, J. Eells and C. Burton, ‘The Good Life, Broadly and Narrowly
Considered’, in P. Linley and S. Joseph (eds), Positive Psychology in Practice,
Wiley, 2004, pp. 35–51, at 42–45.
50 Bok, above n. 10, pp. 5–6, 30. See also Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11,
pp. 310–311.
51 Bok, above n. 10, p. 21 (there are only a few health problems that people
do not adapt to, mainly chronic pain and fatal diseases such as AIDS or cancer).
52 Ibid., pp. 12, 15. See also Frey, above n. 8, p. 8 summarising studies.
53 Bok, above n. 10, p. 16. Note that religion can be substituted for a sense
of purpose. Studies have found that more generally, a meaning to one’s life also
makes people happier. On this, see W. Pavot and E. Diener, ‘Findings on
Subjective Well-being: Applications to Public Policy, Clinical Interventions and
Education’, in P. Linley and S. Joseph (eds), Positive Psychology in Practice,
Wiley, 2004, pp. 679–691, at 683.
54 Bok, above n. 10, p. 19; Pavot and Diener, above n. 53, at 683 adding that
the quality of the social relationships is also important.
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power of each individual to change.55 Fifth, well-being is achieved when
human needs are fulfilled. However, the problem is to determine what
human needs are. While there is agreement on basic (i.e. biological)
needs and some other needs, some needs may be culturally determined
and therefore not universal.56 I will come back to this point in section 5.
These important findings lead us to ask the question addressed by the
next section.
4. SHOULD POLICYMAKERS TAKE HAPPINESS INTO
ACCOUNT?
The first point of controversy is whether happiness, in either of its
meanings, is a universal value and therefore self-evidently desirable for
governments to pursue. Research has shown that for human beings all
over the world, whatever their age, gender, culture, or life experience, the
ultimate, or at least the most important, goal is to be happy.57 Surveys
also show that most people seek happiness in a similar way, i.e. good
health and a happy family life rank high all over the world.58 Two small
caveats are that collectivist cultures emphasise collective well-being over
individual well-being;59 and to say that all societies seem to value
happiness is only valid for contemporary societies because in the past,
there were some societies that glorified suffering rather than happiness.60
55 S. Lyubomirsky, ‘What about Genetics?’, in Leo Bormans (ed.), The
World Book of Happiness, Marshall Cavendish Trade, 2011, pp. 64–65; S.
Nelson and S. Lyubomirsky, ‘Finding Happiness: Tailoring Positive Activities for
Optimal Well-Being Benefits’, in M. Tugade, M. Shiota and L. Kirby (eds),
Handbook of Positive Emotions, Guilford, 2012, pp. 3 and 4 of the pre-print pdf,
available at https://sites.google.com/a/ucr.edu/snels007/publications and refer-
ences therein.
56 S. Alkire, ‘Dimensions of Human Development’ (2002) 3(2) World
Development, 181–205.
57 Frey, above n. 8, pp. 1, 3, 5; Nelson and Lyubomirsky, above n. 55, p. 2
and references therein.
58 Veenhoven, above n. 24, p. 341.
59 Veenhoven, above n. 24, pp. 339–340. See also P. Brey, ‘Is Information
Ethics Culture-Relative?’ (2007) 3(3) International Journal of Technology and
Human Interaction, Special Issue Information Ethics: Global Issues, Local
Perspectives, Guest ed. C. Ess, pp. 12–24.
60 Veenhoven, above n. 24, p. 340.
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It has been proven that happiness is a state that animals, including
human beings, naturally tend towards.61 Indeed, the function of happiness
is that we seek what is good for us namely food, sex, friendship, love,
etc., because that makes us survive.62 At least one commentator goes
further and declares that happiness is special because it is the only good
accepted as an end in itself: while there are a lot of other good things
one would want in life such as “health, autonomy, accomplishment,
relationships, a sense of meaning … If we ask why they matter, we can
generally give some further answers – for example, that they make
people feel better and more able to enjoy their lives. But if we ask why it
matters if people feel better, we can give no further answer. It is
self-evidently desirable.”63 Nevertheless, some commentators note that
happiness is not innate in humans as there are individuals who do not
seek happiness, namely those individuals who are simply trying to
survive and those who choose to “forsake happiness for ideological
reasons”.64 However, once people in this situation have succeeded in
surviving, the vast majority of them wish to be happy.65 As to the second
type, their happiness is eudaimonic and not hedonic.66 Another objection
is that happiness neglects altruism.67 However, research has shown that
being altruistic increases happiness.68 A more fundamental objection to
the argument that happiness is self-evidently desirable is that it is
tautological.69 Furthermore, it is not because something is natural that it
is automatically ethical.70 For instance, if we would follow a version of
Darwin’s survival of the fittest rule, we might want to advocate killing or
abandoning old or disabled people. Surely, this is something which hurts
our sense of ethics. In short, we should not follow a law of nature if it is
61 Layard, above n. 11, p. 224.
62 Layard, above n. 11, p. 24. See also King, Eells and Burton, above n. 49,
at 36.
63 Layard, above n. 11, pp. 240–241, 246.
64 Veenhoven, above n. 24, p. 341.
65 Veenhoven admits that once beyond the survival stage, most people will
be interested in happiness (email on file with the author).
66 Examples include people sacrificing pleasure (hedonia) to attain a mean-
ingful life such as some monks and nuns but in this case, their suffering may lead
to happiness in the sense of eudaemonia either on earth or after life or their
suffering will lead to the happiness of others.
67 F. Fureidi, ‘Why the “Politics of Happiness” Makes Me Mad’, 2006,
available at http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/311/
68 Layard, above n. 11, p. 141.
69 Duncan, above n. 19, p. 172.
70 Ibid.
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not ethical or moral. Adopting a law of nature as a norm (i.e. “an attempt
to derive a norm from a fact, or an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’”) is known in
philosophy as a naturalistic fallacy.71 In this type of argument, the
premise is descriptive while its conclusion is normative but “no evidence
has been presented that the truth of the premise has any bearing on the
truth of the conclusion”.72 Applied to happiness, the argument would go
like this: it is in human nature to be happy as proven by biology (fact) so
all human beings should strive to be happy and governments should aim
to create or increase their constituents’ happiness (duty). This has led
some to conclude that happiness, no matter how desirable it may be, is
not a new science73 but nothing more than another ideology like
liberalism or Marxism.74 There is no space here to counter this argument
and I leave it to my next piece of scholarship. Suffice it to say that the
naturalistic fallacy can be avoided by adopting a value derived from the
fact and using this value as the basis for the norm.
Despite these objections, the vast majority of the contemporary litera-
ture agrees that happiness is an important value that politicians and
lawmakers should pursue. The chief reasons are that it is the main goal of
the vast majority of human beings, people’s happiness can be created or
increased and happiness has positive effects on the individual, his/her
family and friends and more generally his/her community, and on society
as a whole (happy people are healthier, more sociable, tolerant and
generous and perform their jobs better).75 Most researchers also agree
that happiness is a responsibility which should be shared between the
individual and the state.76 Otherwise, it would lead to a nanny state
where people expect the government to make them happy and take no
responsibility for themselves.77 The law is only one among other means
which can influence well-being.78 There is some disagreement as to
whether happiness is the only, the ultimate, value that governments
71 Brey, above n. 59, pp. 6–7.
72 Brey, above n. 59, p. 7.
73 For Layard, above n. 11, happiness is a new science as the title of his
book itself claims.
74 G. Duncan, ‘After Happiness’ (2007) 12(1) Journal of Political Ideolo-
gies, 85–108, pp. 101–102, 104–105.
75 Bok, above n. 10, pp. 51, 53; Nelson and Lyubomirsky, above n. 55, p. 4
citing Lyubomirsky, King and Diener, 2005 who meta-analysed 225 studies. The
positive effects of happiness are one way to derive a value from the fact (that we
all want to be happy) as per the above.
76 Bok, above n. 10, p. 51 and generally Chapter 11.
77 See e.g. Fureidi, above n. 67; Duncan, above n. 19, p. 175.
78 Bok, above n. 10, p. 54. See also introduction above.
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should pursue or only one among other important values.79 For so-called
Benthamites, like Veenhoven or Layard, happiness is the only value
policymakers should pursue: as it is self-evident,80 it is the most
desirable.81 However, most think that governments should pursue happi-
ness so long as it is at no cost to other values. Indeed, if happiness were
the only aim then governments should never help oppressed people, who
have adapted to their fate and are content. However, that offends our
sense of justice or fairness which demands that their fate be bettered.
Happiness should therefore be one of the goals of government along with
other values such as fairness, human rights (including equal rights,
freedom), duties, virtues, capabilities, which must be upheld.82 If happi-
ness clashes with one of the other values, then a balance must be made.83
In any case, empirical evidence shows that there is generally no conflict
between happiness and other values; on the contrary, values such as civil
rights (e.g. freedom) are conducive to happiness.84
In conclusion, research shows that at least the gratification of basic
needs is universal. The vast majority of researchers agree that govern-
ments should promote conditions of happiness, even if there is disagree-
ment as to whether happiness should be the state’s only or most
important goal.
79 See Bok, above n. 10, pp. 61–62, the aim of government is not only
happiness; Nelson and Lyubomirsky, above n. 55; Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11,
p. 316; Hsee, Xu and Tang, above n. 7 (important but not only goal). Likewise,
even if some psychologists have focused their energies on happiness, it does not
mean that they think it is the only good in life. No one in the field appears to
advocate a life of hedonism. See e.g. King, Eells and Burton, above n. 49, p. 38.
Contrast with Y. Ng and L. Ho, ‘Introduction: Happiness as the Only Ultimate
Objective of Public Policy’, in Y. Ng and L. Ho (eds), Happiness and Public
Policy: Theory, Case Studies and Implications, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006,
pp. 1–16, who think it is the only ultimate policy goal.
80 Layard, above n. 11, p. 246.
81 Veenhoven, above n. 13, p. 675.
82 Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, above n. 3, at 1608; Duncan, above
n. 19, p. 172. Benthamites would argue that these values are subsumed within
happiness. Again there is no space to address this argument and it is not
necessary for the purpose of this chapter, so we leave it to another article.
83 Bok, above n. 10, p. 60; L. Bruni, ‘The Ambivalence of the Good Life:
Happiness, Economics, Technology and Relational Goods’, in P. Brey, A. Briggle
and E. Spence (eds), The Good Life in a Technological Age, Routledge, 2012,
p. 109, at 116–117, referring to Amartya Sen’s writings.
84 Veenhoven, above n. 13, pp. 672, 676. Many surveys show that the
happiest people are those who live in countries which respect human rights.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS OF HAPPINESS RESEARCH
A. Change of Focus: Back to “Genuine Utilitarianism”
In all scientific branches, happiness research aims to guide policy.85
Researchers advocate a gross national happiness (GNH) indicator in
addition to or even instead of gross national product (GNP).86 Research-
ers also agree that instead of focusing on economic growth, which in
developed countries, does not increase happiness, governments of devel-
oped countries should focus on policies which increase people’s happi-
ness, namely which improve health87 and family life, maintain full
employment88 and control inflation, and limit the status race.89 In this
respect, Easterlin and in a more precise way, Hsee et al. have proposed
that governments promote consumption of goods people do not adapt to
in order to avoid hedonic adaptation.90 Hsee et al. also suggest that
governments promote inherently evaluable rather than inherently inevalu-
able consumption; in short, this means investing resources in goods and
85 Brey, above n. 2, p. 24.
86 See e.g. Veenhoven, above n. 13; Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11, section
14.8. An alternative vision of how to use happiness research for policy, Frey and
Stutzer, above n. 11, pp. 314–315; Anielski, above n. 47; Brey, above n. 2, p. 28
(apart from Bhutan, which was the pioneer, “Other countries that are using, or
are considering using, GNH indices include Thailand, China, Australia, Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom. Critics of GNH argue that such indices can
easily be slanted by governments who may define GNH in ways that suit their
interest, and that the existence of different national indices will make inter-
national comparisons difficult”). For the United Kingdom, see the Prime
Minister’s speech on 25 November 2010 available at http://www.number10.
gov.uk/news/pm-speech-on-well-being/.
87 Especially chronic pain and terminal diseases because people do not
adapt to them compared to other illnesses or handicaps, see Layard, above n. 11,
p. 69; Bok, above n. 10, p. 61.
88 Economists find it too simplistic to affirm that full employment does
equate with growth. So happiness researchers do not contradict themselves when
they propose maintaining full employment, contrary to what Duncan (above
n. 19, p. 174) argues.
89 On all these points, see Easterlin, above n. 12, p. 54. One example is
banning commercial advertising aimed at children to avoid conditioning them to
consume more, see Layard, above n. 11, p. 234. Other examples are monitoring
taxes, which play a role in preserving the work–life balance and performance-
related pay, which tends to encourage the status race, see Layard, above n. 11,
p. 233.
90 Easterlin, above n. 12, p. 54; Hsee, Xu and Tang, above n. 7.
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services which fulfil basic human needs such as (better) sanitation,
heating, medicines, communication systems, etc. rather than luxuries, or
giving incentives to businesses to do so.91 This is because the free-market
system does not always encourage businesses to produce inherently
evaluable goods or services. This is not a surprise as businesses produce
what people want and people are not good judges of what they need.92
Hsee et al. conclude that goods and services which fulfil basic human
needs and goods and services people do not adapt to are generally the
same. The converse is also true, namely goods and services people adapt
to are those which do not fulfil basic needs.93 In sum, economic growth
should no longer be a major goal.94 Governments should perform a
different type of cost–benefit analysis (namely choose those policies that
will increase happiness the most for any given cost).95 Some propose to
even move from a cost–benefit analysis to a well-being analysis.96
At this point, it is necessary to determine what human needs are. Even
if it may be difficult to agree on a single and therefore universal list of
needs, whatever one wants to call them – basic goods and services,
functionings, capabilities, dimensions – both theoretical and empirical
research shows a very high degree of convergence.97 Of course, the
91 Hsee, Xu and Tang, above n. 7.
92 See above section 3.
93 Hsee, Xu and Tang, above n. 7. (“For example, compared with the size of
a diamond, ambient temperature is both more inherently evaluable and more
resistant to adaptation”).
94 Frey, above n. 8, p. 201.
95 Layard, above n. 11, p. 257.
96 Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, above n. 3.
97 J. Johnstone, ‘Capabilities and Technology’, in P. Brey, A. Briggle and E.
Spence (eds), The Good Life in a Technological Age, Routledge, 2012, p. 89;
Alkire, above n. 56; F. Rauschmayer, I. Omann, J. Frühmann and L. Bohunovsky
‘What About Needs? Re-conceptualising Sustainable Development’, SERI Work-
ing Paper, No. 8, 2008. For some commentators, this search for good feeling (the
gratification of universal “needs” such as eating, drinking etc.) is more important
than contentment, which depends on meeting culturally variable “wants” (Ameri-
can businessmen have higher standards of living than say Tibetan monks and the
current generation generally tends to want to live more comfortably than
previous generations). This is because contentment is largely driven by the search
for good feeling. See Veenhoven, above n. 24, pp. 332–334. It goes without
saying that without first satisfying our basic needs, it is difficult to survive and
thus be more generally content. Thus the fulfilment of these needs naturally must
come first. As Veenhoven, above n. 13, p. 664 argues, it seems logical though
that life satisfaction is more appropriate as a policy goal than passing satisfac-
tions because the former is more valuable.
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literature agrees that people should have the right to fulfil their basic or
biological needs (drinking, eating, breathing, etc.) but the agreement goes
beyond these basic needs. In a wide-ranging comparison of the literature
on these aspects across fields, Alkire found only few differences98 but
notes that most lists she reviewed are Western and therefore biased; a
synthesis of needs therefore requires expanding the literature review.99
More research therefore needs to be done in order to guide policymakers.
B. Caveat: The Danger of Paternalism
Notwithstanding this enthusiasm for applying happiness research in
policy-making, researchers caution that it carries with it a danger of
paternalism100 or authoritative decisions by the state.101 To avoid this,
happiness researchers stress that policies should therefore aim at increas-
ing people’s awareness of what makes them happy and what is hedonic
adaptation and social comparison, in short educating them.102 Thus,
governments should improve the processes rather than intervening
directly to improve the outcomes.103 In other words, policymakers should
not impose happiness, even less their idea of happiness,104 but make it
possible for people to achieve it in the way they want,105 e.g. via
prioritisation or incentives.106 In addition, in as much as governments
would like to increase their constituents’ happiness, they cannot do it
98 Many of the needs identified in the reviewed literature are not morally
connotated but simply refer to things people value doing, but other commenta-
tors’ lists only refer to universal needs (see M. Max-Neef, Human Scale
Development: Conception, Application and Further Reflections, Apex Press,
1993; M. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach, Cambridge University Press, 2000 cited by Rauschmayer et al., above
n. 97) and many of these relate more to eudaimonic than hedonic well-being
(Rauschmayer et al., above n. 97, p. 13).
99 Alkire, above n. 56. She reviews 15 different lists established by different
authors and discusses seven of these in detail.
100 Frey, above n. 8, pp. 168–169; 201. See also Rauschmayer et al., above
n. 97, pp. 14–15.
101 Duncan, above n. 19, p. 177.
102 Layard, above n. 11, pp. 199–201 (who proposes “education for life”
courses); Frey, above n. 8, p. 155. See also Easterlin, above n. 12, pp. 56–57, and
references therein; Bok, above n. 10, pp. 76, 210–211.
103 Frey and Stutzer, above n. 11, p. 316.
104 This is the task of philosophers or religious authorities.
105 Frey, above n. 8, pp. 168–169.
106 Bok, above n. 10, p. 211. Note that this is also what the capability
approach advocates. See Rauschmayer et al., above n. 97, p. 16.
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against their constituents’ will. Indeed, since politicians are elected, it
would be political suicide if they went against the population’s wishes.107
And since currently people mistakenly think economic growth is the key
to happiness, politicians focus on growth.108 So not only for the reason
we gave above but also for this additional reason, people must first be
educated as to the real causes of happiness and start being convinced that
consuming less is a good idea so that they can then influence politics by
voting for politicians who will focus less on economic growth. Govern-
ments can start educating people but also the press, NGOs, schools,
academics, etc. In short, a change of focus from GDP to GNH will be
hard and will take time.
On the other hand, some paternalism cannot be entirely avoided. A first
reason is that it is impossible for governments to be neutral even if
liberalism, which is still dominant in Western political thinking, advo-
cates that government policies should be neutral on the question of the
good life.109 Indeed, so-called liberal neutrality “refers to values such as
liberty, autonomy, respect, and equality and not every reasonable person
would give them the same central and foundational place in the moral
governance structure of the state as the political liberalist would”.110
Therefore, some commentators argue that as governments cannot be
neutral, instead they should acknowledge that every position is morally
tainted, respect each position and attempt to find consensus regarding the
relationship between technology and the good life.111 Furthermore, the
relationship between technology and happiness should be more critically
discussed; society in general and governments in particular should think
more carefully about which technologies they want to allow or promote
by examining whether they are really good for us.112 They should do this
instead of simply assessing all technologies equally in terms of risk by
107 Bok, above n. 10, pp. 58–59.
108 Ibid., p. 73.
109 J. van den Hoven, ‘Neutrality and Technology: Ortega Y Gasset on the
Good Life’, in P. Brey, A. Briggle and E. Spence (eds), The Good Life in a
Technological Age, Routledge, 2012, pp. 327–334, citing Rawls and Dworkin as
examples.
110 Ibid., p. 334.
111 Ibid., p. 336.
112 P.-P. Verbeek, ‘On Hubris and Hybrids: Ascesis and the Ethics of
Technology’, in P. Brey, A. Briggle and E. Spence (eds), The Good Life in a
Technological Age, Routledge, 2012, pp. 265–269. See also Van den Hoven,
above n. 109, pp. 333, 337; C. Mitcham and A. Briggle, ‘Theorizing Tech-
nology’, in P. Brey, A. Briggle and E. Spence (eds), The Good Life in a
Technological Age, Routledge, 2012, p. 35, at 48.
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weighing the costs and benefits of each technology to decide whether or
not to introduce it.
Second, a dose of paternalism is sometimes unavoidable and even
justified because in some cases, human needs run counter to environ-
mental needs and fulfilling the needs of one generation may encroach on
the fulfilment of those of the next, and the one after that, etc.113 This
applies in many areas and as I have argued elsewhere, also to intellectual
property law. Intellectual property law, like environmental law, cannot
remain anthropocentric but needs to be ecocentric.114
6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAPPINESS RESEARCH
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. Relevance of Happiness Research to Patents and Related Rights
Intellectual property laws, and patents and related rights especially, are
still nowadays based on the utilitarian rationale, which derives from the
writings of Bentham and Mill.115 In short, humans seek pleasure rather
than pain116 so policymakers should follow this principle of utility as
well.117 IPR are justified by the positive consequences they bring for the
common well-being. IPR are granted by society according to the benefits
which society wants to obtain. Thus IPR are incentives to create and
innovate and allow the inventors and creators to recoup their investment.
113 Rauschmayer et al., above n. 97, p. 30.
114 E. Derclaye, ‘Patent Law’s Role in the Protection of the Environment:
Re-assessing patent law and its justifications in the 21st century’ (2009) 3
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 249–273 and
E. Derclaye, above n. 4.
115 Traditionally, namely since the intellectual property laws were adopted
during the Enlightenment and up until now, intellectual property laws have been
based broadly on two main rationales: the natural rights (in which one can
include the labour theory) and utilitarianism (in which one can include the
incentive theory). In the 20th century, at least in the Western world, utilitarianism
won the battle of ideas to justify intellectual property. See E. Derclaye and M.
Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps, Hart, 2011, pp. 298–304.
116 As per our discussion above in section 4 on the natural state of happiness.
117 Note that Bentham’s theory involves not only happiness as such but
equality, and thus fairness, in happiness in the sense that every person is equally
important as far as happiness is concerned. Layard, above n. 11, p. 5. See also
Utilitarianism, Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition, 2012, avail-
able at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/620682/utilitarianism
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The idea behind this justification is that progress is desirable. However,
as it currently stands, the justification is distorted because happiness, or
well-being, came to be assessed only by a proxy, namely income.
Happiness evaluated in non-monetary terms, i.e. in the sense of living a
good life or simply feeling good has disappeared from the picture
altogether. This is because in addition, a dose of liberalism, and neo-
liberalism, impregnates IPR. Liberalism rests on two assumptions. First,
a competitive free market economy is good because it leads to economic
growth and prosperity. Since creation and innovation, which IPR promote
and protect, help foster economic growth, IPR must be promoted.
Liberalism and neo-liberalism have also brought with them capitalism
and consumerism. However, as we have seen, research has shown that
economic growth, which increases income, does not after a certain point,
increase happiness. Second, liberalism believes in neutrality. Hence
patent laws foster all kinds of technology.118 Because of this neutrality,
patents and related rights laws promote those technologies which lead to
hedonic adaptation and contribute to the hedonic treadmill and status
race. The question thus poses itself: shouldn’t we change the basis of
patents and related rights or rather, go back to “genuine utilitarianism”
and foster happiness as a whole rather than just via a single proxy,
namely material wealth or economic growth? Shouldn’t we promote the
“right” kind of technologies, i.e. those which fulfil our needs and resist
hedonic adaptation and social comparison? I am not suggesting that our
current patent and related right laws do not do this already to some extent
but because of their neutrality, they also foster the “wrong” kind of
technologies.
B. Which Changes can be made to our Patents and Related Rights
Laws?
If we accept the evidence explained in section 5, we need to foster the
technologies which fulfil our needs, not our wants, in other words, foster
technologies which resist hedonic adaptation and social comparison.119
The problem, as sketched in section 5, is to identify what these needs are.
118 A very strong version of liberalism exists for instance in the USA where
immoral inventions are not excluded from patentability. A softer version of
liberalism exists in Europe where inventions whose commercial exploitation
would be immoral cannot be patented. See Art. 53 European Patent Convention.
119 Frey, above n. 8, p. 201; Van den Hoven, above n. 109, p. 333 (we need to
ensure we are happy with the technologies we foster because they are congruent
with our vision of a good life).
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That depends on the list of needs one chooses and, if one wants to apply
patents and related rights all over the world, whether this list can be truly
universal. Some countries may decide to choose a specific list while
others nations would embrace only part of it or choose a different list
because they diverge on which needs should be fulfilled. In this respect,
choosing a list which is applicable at international level means attempting
to end the dispute concerning the universality or the cultural relativity of
needs. The vast majority of the lists of needs catalogued by Alkire (even
if biased, i.e. “Western made”) include life, health, nutrition, security or
shelter, affection and affiliation.120 For the rest, they differ more or less
importantly. It would be hard to dispute that every human being has a
right to live and be in good health i.e. that it is not a universal need.121
This would mean that our patent and related rights laws should promote,
for instance, new drugs which cure or eradicate the most lethal and
crippling diseases and inventions which enable better nutrition and
sanitation.122
It must be noted that in relation to IPR, the inquiry relating to cultural
relativism is double. Indeed, this philosophical dispute also applies to the
nature of the rights used as a tool to promote the technologies we need.
Cultural relativism argues that if one wants to import a value from one
society to another, one has to convince this other society it would be a
good addition or that this other society’s idea of the good is flawed.123 It
is not clear that granting property rights in intangibles is the universal
way to foster creation and invention, let alone that any sort of right
should attach to any intellectual output even if original or new. Intellec-
tual property lawyers have already criticised this view especially when
intellectual property achieved the status of a human right through case
law of the European Court of Human Rights under the umbrella of the
human right to property and later in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Indeed, it is clear that collectivist countries (where the focus is on
the collective) such as many Asian countries do not see certain things in
the same way as individualist countries such as many Western countries
120 One will not fail to note that these values include many human rights that
international conventions already secure universally.
121 See Nussbaum, above n. 98, p. 95.
122 This may or may not be possible simply because of the lack of sufficient
monetary incentive and other ways than the patent system may have to be used in
some cases, e.g. prizes or government funding.
123 Brey, above n. 59, pp. 7–8.
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(where the focus is on the individual, e.g. human rights are para-
mount).124 Intellectual property law is a Western value which is not
generally accepted in other, non-Western, cultures.125 Therefore, as
intellectual property is not universally accepted, an attempt to say it is
universally valid must be scrutinised.126 Hence, in addition to changing
the basis of patent and related rights, it may be necessary to find a middle
way, to re-centre the rights between excessive individualist and collectiv-
ist perspectives,127 and for instance maybe abandon property rights in
some cases and replace them with remuneration rights or exceptions
etc.128 This shows even more that it is important to base intellectual
“property” rights, or rather rights in intellectual endeavours to put it in a
less culturally biased way, on universal values, if at all possible, to give
them a strong basis which many countries can accept rather than impose
a Western value system, which in addition, may also be (fully or partly)
wrong.129 It therefore seems appropriate that different moral systems talk
to one another to try and determine common values to build intellectual
“property” laws that respect their different moral systems, something that
among others, the new philosophical field of “intercultural information
ethics” has started to do.130
Once this choice about needs is made, there are several ways of
promoting the technologies which fulfil them via our patents and related
rights system entailing different degrees of paternalism or state interven-
tion. From the least to the most paternalistic, one can think of (1)
prioritising such technologies over others (e.g. quicker search, publica-
tion and/or patent grant, fewer taxes for applying and/or renewing those
124 But some scholars dispute that there is much difference between cultures
on basic capabilities which broadly correspond to human rights, see Nussbaum,
above n. 98, pp. 97–100.
125 Brey, above n. 59, p. 6.
126 Ibid., p. 2.
127 Indeed both rights-centred (the West) and virtue-centred systems (the
East) have flaws. The West’s values lead to avarice, poverty, selfishness,
loneliness and depression whereas the East’s lead to totalitarianism, corruption
and a poor economy. See Brey, above n. 59, pp. 7–8.
128 Current patent and related rights laws already incorporate these to some
extent.
129 Derclaye, above n. 4.
130 Brey, above n. 59, pp. 8–9, citing R. Capurro, ‘Intercultural Information
Ethics’, in R. Capurro, J. Frühbaure and T. Hausmanningers (eds), Localizing the
Internet, Ethical Issues, Fink Verlag, 2005, available at http://www.capurro.de/
iie.html. Discussions over the Development Agenda at WIPO are another
example, see http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/
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patents), similar to some of the initiatives that many patent offices around
the world have adopted for environmentally sound technologies,131 (2)
excluding from patentability technologies which do not fulfil these needs
(e.g. through the morality clause or another independent legal provision
inside the patent and related rights laws) and (3) adding a new condition
of patentability which requires applicants to prove that their invention
fulfils at least one need in the agreed list.132
C. Happiness is not the onlyAim
I have shown elsewhere that the incentive theory in so far as it relies on
the idea of progress is flawed.133 Nevertheless, patents and related rights
can still grant incentives, but to foster happiness as a whole instead of
simply fostering economic growth.134 That being said, in the same way
that happiness should not be the only goal of government, it should not
be the single aim of IPR. In fact, if human happiness were the only aim,
it would not (or not necessarily, depending on which list of needs one
chooses) for instance take into account the environment, namely the flora
and fauna and non-living earthly resources.135 The fulfilment of needs to
achieve happiness may help in terms of this generation’s happiness but
may not in respect of future ones.136 In this case, paternalism is justified
and stricter patentability conditions may be required. In any case, a high
level of well-being is not per se incompatible with sustainable develop-
ment.137 On the contrary, studies have shown that a sustainable lifestyle
makes people happy and vice versa. In this respect, rich countries have
131 E. Derclaye, ‘Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet? An inquiry from
the point of view of environmental law’ (2009) European Intellectual Property
Review 168–184; 227–235, at 230. Currently the patent offices who have adopted
such measures are those of the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
Japan, China, Israel, Canada, Korea, Australia and Brazil.
132 A variant of this would be to prioritise those inventions which fulfil some
of these needs rather than others. But as the majority of the literature agrees that
needs should not be hierarchical, this measure would be controversial.
133 Derclaye, above n. 4.
134 With the caveat that property rights may not be the right instrument for
IPR to be truly universal. See above section 6.B.
135 For instance, Nussbaum’s list (above n. 99) includes interaction with
other species and that includes the environment generally.
136 Rauschmayer et al., above n. 97, p. 30.
137 Ibid., p. 27 citing P. Hofstetter and M. Madjar, ‘Linking change in
happiness, time-use, sustainable consumption, and environmental impacts – An
attempt to understand time-rebound effects’, BAO & Consultrix, 2003. See
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much to learn from poorer ones, which enjoy an equally high well-being
but consume less.138 In addition, at least in the EU, legislators are obliged
to take environmental protection into account in other policies, including
intellectual property policy.139 Thus the liberalist view, once rid of the
progress idea still at the root of IPR, can be curtailed or at least balanced
by other aims namely happiness and sustainability. These aims can be
combined without (much140) conflict. Indeed, sustainability and happi-
ness are strongly connected: human beings cannot be happy if they do
not respect other elements they depend on, because the latter’s unhealthy
state will, at least in the end, affect human beings. Further, human
survival rests on the entire planet’s well-being.141 Research has also
shown that environmental degradation makes people unhappy so that
governments should protect the environment.142 In addition, the problem
economic growth poses in terms of happiness (Easterlin paradox) also
exacerbates the problem it poses in terms of the environment. More
growth does not bring happiness and more growth brings environmental
problems. This shows neatly that the two bases (happiness and environ-
mental protection) are linked.
7. CONCLUSION
So what must be done? What are the next steps? Which further research
should be undertaken? We need, if not a revolution, an evolution in the
intellectual property law world. The intellectual property system does not
steer a totally wrong course, but may need to change its trajectory a little
or at least go back to its original, unaltered, utilitarian rationale, with
additional, related, goals. As I have tried to show, happiness as the
fulfilment of needs should be one of the goals of patents and related
rights; this includes the incentive theory rid of the progress idea, so
understood only as a means to recoup an investment. As we have seen, a
Anielski, above n. 47, p. 222 citing The un(Happy) Planet Index, New Eco-
nomics Foundation, 2006, p. 3 (“The study even shows that some countries with
a very high ecological footprint live slightly less long happy lives than those with
a very small ecological footprint”).
138 Anielski, above n. 47, p. 218.
139 Derclaye, above n. 131, pp. 169–177.
140
“Die-hard” liberalists will surely not be happy (pun intended) with this
proposal as it puts some limits concerning which technologies can be patented or
protected by designs, plant variety rights, etc.
141 Derclaye, above n. 4, p. 533.
142 Frey, above n. 8, p. 158.
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component of happiness includes making a living and IPR, through the
incentive aspect, already promote this for inventors and creators. Sustain-
ability should be its other core goal and is linked to happiness as we are
not concerned only with the well-being of the current generation or that
of humans only. This (r)evolution has already started with the discussions
of intellectual property and human development and intellectual property
and green technologies. Scholarship should capitalise on this movement
and blend these trends. In this respect there should be more discussion of
what technologies are good for us or in other words, identification of
technologies which fulfil our needs. More specifically this (r)evolution
must not only be fed from within intellectual property law or even law
but it must nourish itself from the research that has been done in other
disciplines.143 What remains to be done is to shape patents and related
rights according to these aims and determine a list of needs and choose
among the many different mechanisms available (prioritisation of some
inventions, new or additional conditions of patentability, etc). As stated
above, since people and governments, with few exceptions,144 are still
entirely focused on economic growth, this aim may be hard to achieve,
but it is the role of scientists to enlighten policymakers and more
generally society.
143 Layard, above n. 11, pp. 145–147; T. Wong, ‘Introduction’, in Wong and
Dutfield, above n. 5, p. 47 (“A multidisciplinary approach is especially needed
for policy reforms relating to IP, given that property rights in the intangible can
have both positive and negative impacts on nearly all aspects of human
development”); Brey, above n. 2, p. 32 (“Much is to be gained, also, from more
collaboration between the disciplines: philosophy, psychology, and economics, as
well as policy studies and engineering”); Frey, above n. 8, pp. 13 and 14
(“Happiness research excels in its interdisciplinary orientation”).
144 See e.g. Bhutan and the United Kingdom, above n. 86. Another example
is J. Mujica, the President of Uruguay, who has like-minded opinions and could
be an example for many other leaders, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
20243493
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